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THE ETHNICIZATION OF POLITICS AND THE POLITICIZATION OF ETHNICITY: 
CULTURE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Preben Kaarsholm 
The thoughts contained in this paper were first tried out in the context of a workshop on 
"Gender and Ethnicity in a Modernizing World" which was organized by the Centre for 
Development Research, Copenhagen, in collaboration with International Development 
Studies, Roskilde, in February 1992. The paper represents a stage of further reflection and 
has been able to benefit from the very valuable discussions which took place at the 
Copenhagen workshop. 
Initially, let me put forward a few words of clarification regarding the status of "ethnicity" as 
a category of social identification. I would agree with a statement made by Karen Hansen 
during the Copenhagen workshop that gender and ethnicity do not automatically sit easily 
together on an agenda for discussion.1 They seem to constitute different layers or levels 
within the complex of multiple identities and bases for cultural and political mobilization 
that we really seem to be discussing. In a context of overlapping, fluctuating, shifting and 
mutually interlinked identifications according to signifiers like class, language, religion, 
caste, generation, clan affiliation, social movement or ideological attachment, or whatever 
other register might be set as  relevant, gender appears to constitute a more basic level of 
identity or differentiation, underlying and interacting with other layers but presenting 
different problems for a discussion of possibilities and obstacles for politicization. Thus, in 
his book The Remembered Village, the Indian anthropologist M. N. Srinivas describes how 
differences of gender overruled those of caste and religion in his Mysore village even as the 
chaos of partition was at its height in 1947-48.2 And Norma Kriger, in her recent study of 
struggles within the struggle of the Zimbabwean war of decolonization, demonstrates that of 
all the fronts that were opened within the war, between generations, lineages, etc., the one 
over gender issues was the one whose battles brought about the least change.3 Thus, while 
it may make sense to discuss how gender gets modelled and articulated through discourses 
of ethnicity, it is misleading to think of gender and ethnicity as constituting parallel types 
of "primordial identity" which can be theorized and approached methodologically in the 
same way. 
But this is by the by. In these brief remarks, I shall focus on ethnicity as  a level of 
discourse, identification and creation of difference which can be drawn upon and prioritized 
in processes of political mobilization, and consider some of the consequences such 
politicization may have for the understanding and function of ethnicity. 
According to the assumptions of "classical" modernization theory, American and West 
European thinking about relations between economic, social, political and cultural 
development of the 1950s and 1960s. "traditional" cultural differentiations and the 
ascription of particular social functions to particular social groups would become eroded in 
the process of economic modernization and give way to anonymized, individualized and 
empathy-oriented modes of outlook and self-understanding which would again provide the 
precondition for the emergence of modern types of participatory and equality-based systems 
of political representation and government.4 This was seen as a unidirectional process 
which was "tragic" inasmuch as it replaced a world of dense cultural riches with an "iron 
cage" of secularized rationality and atomization; more importantly, however, it was regarded 
as one of liberating human potential from the shackles of arbitrarily assigned ascriptions 
and limitations.5 A similarly unidirectional view has been characteristic of Marxist theories 
of modernization, which have tended to regard ethnicity not so much a s  a "genie in a 
bottle"6 but rather as a backward-looking, semi-fascist devil belonging to a world of ideology 
and rural idiocy which the development of productive forces would replace by one of 
rational class struggle and universalized notions of what constitutes oppression and 
freedom. Thus, already in 1848, Frederick Engels ridiculed Scandinavianism as  a 
particularly retrograde mode of thinking, as drunken barbarism and brutality against 
women masked by sentimentality soaked in tears.7 
The paradigmatic and unidirectional character of both these models has, however, been 
undermined by the extremely varied and broken ways in which modernization has 
progressed in different parts of the world, where any direct cause-effect relation between base 
and superstructure, between economic accumulation and a rise in equality, participation or 
socialist revolutionary potential now appears to be rather the exception than the rule: 
where, on the one hand, people in a variety of cases have sought refuge in modes of 
cultural identification and differentiation to defend themselves against the uneven 
consequences of modernity rather than enjoyed its unsettling and liberating effects; and 
where, on the other hand, political regimes have been able to use with considerable success 
strategies of cultural separation to consolidate power and control. 
This double process of reacting or adjusting to modernization in ways which are 
diametrically opposed to the assumptions of modernization theory in its two major 
"classical" varieties has manifested itself both in societies where basic programmes of 
economic development have failed and in those where such development has led to 
accumulation, but has also been accompanied by radicalized differentiations in income and 
social welfare a t  the same time a s  "traditional" networks for securing reproduction have 
broken down. 
It would be an interesting project to investigate comparatively the mobilization of ethnicity 
and cultural differentiation for reasons of both state control and popular resistance in 
countries like Uganda or Bangladesh, where hopes of modernization have been 
spectacularly frustrated, and in countries like Brazil. Malaysia, or South Africa, where 
modernization has been comparatively more successful, but also uneven and divisive. 
South Africa is a particularly interesting case, since here ethnicity was deployed much more 
openly and programmatically than anywhere else in world, including even Israel and 
Malaysia. Within an originally colonial project of partial modernization, the manipulation 
of ethnicity was a strategy for state control and social engineering. At the same time, in 
South Africa, ethnicity has become crystallized as  an issue in opposition to politics in a 
particularly clear-cut way which seems to confront two diametrically opposed conceptions 
of how popular aspirations are articulated most authentically and representatively. Views 
so radically opposed that the battle between them threatens to destroy the foundations for 
developing any kind of democratic political culture in South Africa, and which for this very 
reason is being fomented and manipulated by forces whose manifest interest rests with an  
absence of democracy. 
One principal position is represented by the "classical" unifying nationalism of the ANC, 
striving for an equal vote-based, non-racial, democractic constitution and the building of an 
undivided nation. The most radical and coherent argument for the opposite position has 
been formulated by the Conservative Party and its chairman, Andries Treurnicht, the victor 
of the recent Potchefstrom by-election. In an attempt to link into international sympathies 
with federalism and sub-nationalist politics resulting from the break-up of the Soviet Union, 
Treurnicht told the readers of the International Herald Tribune that 
The ethnic awakening and demand for self-determination in Eastern Europe has been 
political practice in South Africa for the past four decades, but is now being betrayed 
[by a democratic dispensation where numbers necessarily will decide] ... South Africa 
has a deeply divided population - along racial, ethnic, cultural, language and religious 
lines ... To force together such largely disparate people, cultures and races. will 
amount to a forin of tyranny, the very opposite of democratic freedom ... [instead we 
must promote] the development of separate freedoms for the various peoples, ethnic 
groups. in their own territories, or homelands.8 
In this way, conservative adherents of the preservation of apartheid can present themselves 
as representatives of the new - of a post-modern, cultural, relativist view of politics as 
opposed to the old-fashioned, centralized, modernist and tyrannically rationalist and 
Jacobin nationalism of the ANC. 
While this contradiction between the centralized nationalism of the ANC and the ethnic 
nationalism of the Conservative Party is straightforward, the position of the Inkatha 
Freedom Party, which is trying to establish itself as representing a position alternative to 
both, is more ambiguous. In the process of redefining itself from a "cultural movement" to a 
"freedom party", Inkatha has toned down, in its public statements, the ethnic components 
in its programme, and has emphasized instead the organization's ambition to further a 
free-enterprise economy and political liberalism along lines which should make the mouth 
of any potential foreign investor (if such still exist) water.9 The preservation of cultural 
values continues to figure prominently on the agenda, but in a pluralist formulation - "to 
promote and support worthy customs and cultures of all South Africans".lo And the party 
is obviously keen in its public appearance to remodel its image from one of Zulu cultural 
nationalism to one of a more all-embracing national representation. Thus at the AGM of 
IFP, which I had the opportunity to attend at Ulundi in July 1991, all speeches were given 
in three languages - Zulu, Sotho and English - and there were violent protests from 
delegates when Tom Langley of the Conservative Party tried to address the meeting as one 
of "the Zulu nation" and convey greetings from "the Afrikaner nation": "We are not Zulus!" 
came the horrified shouts of white Inkatha members. 
In other aspects of its political discourse, its symbolism and style of rhetoric and its 
everyday practice of mobilization, however, there can be no doubt about Inkatha's ethnic 
strategies. While the meeting at  Ulundi was being treated to visions of peaceful pluralist 
democracy, impi warriors armed with "cultural weapons" and uniformed Youth and 
Women's Brigades were dancing defiantly outside the big tents, and each time the President 
rose to speak he was preceded by praise poets who would extol his merits as the figurehead 
of black African political aspirations at  great length. Above all, Inkatha has worked to 
counteract support for the ANC in local constituencies, and this has been done to a large 
extent by urging and pressurizing people to organize along ethnic criteria in opposition to 
the "communism" and universalism of the ANC. With the support of the South African 
Police and the South African Defence Force, Inkatha has thus managed to divide the 
townships of the Rand and tracts of Natal into opposing camps violently fighting each other 
and subscribing not only to different political programmes but to radically different ideas of 
what constitutes political culture or the basic premises for political interaction. Most 
tragically, perhaps, it has been possible for Inkatha also to force sections of the ANC into 
thinking and reacting according to patterns of violent camp politics reflecting the premises 
of its adversary.11 
In this way, the battle between a monadic apartheid conception of politics and a 
universalist democratic one has been moved into the heartlands of black African 
communities, and, as Shula Marks has pointed out in "The Origins of Ethnic Violence in 
South Africa" (see note 61, the battle has been intensified by the "power vacuum" created by 
increased destabilization and economic crisis, of gradual dismantlement of formal and legal 
apartheid measures of social control and, paradoxically, by the growing possibilities for a 
transition from minority to majority rule. 
But the situation is not only one of a "power vacuum" - it is also one of an "ideology 
vacuum", or, to put it differently, of a crisis of political discourse. The Indian political 
scientist Sudipta Kaviraj, has recently described how centralized nationalist discourse in 
India has disintegrated from a situation just before and after independence in which 
nationalist leaders were able to mediate between national and regional languages of politics 
and the dialects of local community political aspirations to one in which nationalist 
discourse has ballooned away from the understanding and articulations of ordinary people 
and become the exclusive domain of elite politicians. In this way a rupture has opened 
between an increasingly abstract sense of national belonging and increasingly hardened and 
particularized, modernized, notions of ethnicity and other forms of communalist identity. 
Where in a previous period ethnicity, like other layers of multiple identity, had a "fuzzy" 
nature which allowed it to be flexibly interwoven with other strands of identity formation 
and mobilization, it now aspires to being a monopolizing force which excludes and 
supersedes other markers of identity. 
South Africa is obviously different from India, but there might still be parallels in the way 
relations between nationalism and ethnicity have developed over the last decades - from the 
generation of nationalist leaders like Nehru and Luthuli to the present generation of leaders 
returning to local politics from the outside, from exile or from prison (on Luthuli as African 
nationalist and Zulu leader, cf. Shula Marks, op. ci t . ) .  In any case, it seems risky to 
understand the battle between the political discourses of nationalism, on the one hand, and 
crystallized ethnicity, on the other, as  only the outcome of state intervention and 
manipulation. There can be no doubt that the discourse of centralized Afi-ican nationalism 
with a socialist orientation during the 1980s has in many ways become problematized 
owing to its banishment from the internal South African scene, to developments of corrupt 
absolutism along nationalist lines in other African countries, and to the collapse of the 
"socialist" societies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and that the contours of an 
alternative discourse on democratic nationalism or regionalism are still very vague. 
There can also be no doubt that if a transition to majority rule is effected, and an ANC-led 
government comes into power, such a government will face overwhelming problems of 
restructuring, redistribution and securing investment in a context of economic crisis as well 
as the tremendous dmculties resulting from intensified urbanization and pressures on 
resources caused by expectations aroused by the dismantlement of apartheid. It is hardly 
possible to be too optimistic about the possibilities of coming to terms with such problems in 
a situation where the institutions of political culture have systematically been eroded, and 
violence has ruled for so long. 
So, although policies of ethnic differentiation may have been discredited as  parts of 
apartheid strategy, and Inkatha compromised by its close links with present South African 
state authorities, it is hard to imagine that political mobilization according to criteria of 
hardened ethnicities will not play a prominent part in South African politics in the future. 
This obviously cannot be prevented by repressing or outlawing ethnic political organization, 
but may hopefully take place in circumstances where the basic premises of political culture 
are not broken up along lines of communalist separation, but occur rather within an 
institutional framework in which ethnic political parties and organizations must compete 
for influence with parties and organizations basing themselves on different programmes and 
discourses. 
In this way, the most fundamental struggle in South Mica appears to be one over the basic 
values and institutions of political culture. Only in circumstances of a basic minimum of 
tolerance and the establishment of possible structures for the mediation of conflict through 
communication and of basic procedural rules for negotiation can one hope for a 
"resoftening" of ethnicity, a demobilization of its violent and xenophobic forms, and for not 
so much a retrogressive reintroduction of aspects of "fuzziness" as a new ironization and 
relativization of notions of ethnicity which will allow them to interact constructively with 
other backgrounds to mobilization. 
It should not be forgotten that such modernized notions of ironized ethnicity are already 
strongly present e.g. in the popular cultures of South Africa - in instances of ethnic culture 
having been reduced to and compartmentalized as folklore, or cases where an ethnic idiom 
is played upon to give a special resonance of humour, irony or affection in otherwise 
"uprooted* and interculturally mixed genres of expression. Examples of this are the ways in 
which elements of Zulu culture have been reworked by mbube choirs13 or by an mbaqanga 
group like Mhlathini and the Mahotella Queens to give expression to messages which are at 
once familiar and comprehensible and critically new. The image of the leopard skin-clad 
Mahlathini being able to stay on his feet spiritually and physically only thanks to the 
support of his three powerful Mahotella Queens presents a redeeming antidote to ideological 
notions of Zulu patriarchy, revitalizing and changing the status of the idiom rather than 
dismissing it. 14 
In contrast with an earlier period where it was possible to understand oneself as at once a 
Zulu proud of one's cultural background and resistance history and as an ANC nationalist 
mobilizing for a South Africa liberated from apartheid, the late 1970s and the 1 980s brought 
about a situation of frontal confrontation between centralized and ethnic nationalism. The 
combination of an Inkatha offensive challenging the hegemony of organizations supporting 
the ANC in African politics with the banishment of the major African nationalist movements 
from the internal political scene led to the emergence of irreconcilably differentiated types of 
self-understanding. Already, during the Soweto uprising of 1976, there were violent clashes 
between township youth supporting the rebellion and the inhabitants of ethnically 
segregated hostels who wanted to stay out of the fray. As such confrontations became more 
widespread, and were fuelled by the interventions of state agents, the ANC became 
increasingly "modern" and anti-ethnic in its outlook and formulations. The roots for ethnic 
mobilization were dismissed as simply reactionary or as the outcome of manip~zlations by a 
conspiracy of white apartheid and opportunist bantustan politicians. A good example of 
the type of analysis offered is provided by Mzala's book on Chief Buthelezi from 1988, which 
does not recognize any variety of unforced popular support for the type of ethnic 
nationalism represented by Inkatha. 15 
Though such an analysis was not simply incorrect, it was definitely one-sided and 
reductionist and overlooked the extent to which the ANC and the centralist nationalism it 
represented had become an abstraction in the everyday life and politics of black South 
Africans. In exile, and with its great unifying leader imprisoned, the political thinking of the 
ANC tended to petrify around notions, arguments and ideas of leadership in ways which 
were being challenged and rethought within left opposition movements elsewhere in the 
world. Thus, instead of understanding the challenge of ethnic nationalist mobilization 
dialectically as the outcome of both conservative manipulation and grassroots frustration 
with other available channels of political articulation and responding to it correspondingly. 
the ANC tended to dismiss the ethnicization of politics out of hand and counter it with a 
programme of democratic nation-building for the whole South Africa, which did not take 
community differentiation and grievances of communication into account and provided 
little more than abstract meaning and a set of symbolic rallying points for local 
constituencies. At the same time, the post-1985 campaign to make local communities 
"ungovernable" and set up alternative structures of counter-hegemony on behalf of the ANC 
"camp", in parallel with the separatist offensive of Inkatha, served to confront centralist 
and ethnic nationalisms as irreconcilably different platforms for mobilization and to escalate 
the violence undermining possibilities for the development of a democratic political culture. 
Only belatedly did the ANC begin to take the ethnic challenge seriously; since then it has 
been attempting through the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa 
(CONTRALESA) and new tactical alliances with some of the homelands governments to 
challenge Inkatha's usurpation and monopolization of "traditional" and ethnic 
articulations and potentials. This coincided, more or less, with the first attempts within the 
ANC to come to terms with the upheavals and clamours for democratic reform which in the 
late 1980s were erupting with unpredictable force in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 
and which forced the organization to confront critically the ideological legacy of "the 
Second World" that had provided its main moral, political and economic support 
throughout the period of exile, and thereby also the "centralism" of its own leadership 
within the struggle for a democratic South Africa. 
Thus, in a 1989 working paper, the general secretary of the South African Communist Party 
and former head of Umkhonto we Sizwe (the ANC's military wing). Joe Slovo, critically 
addressed the dogmatism which had come to characterize the political theory of the South 
African left and its reliance on outdated and disputable notions of the need for a 
"dictatorship of the proletariat", a "vanguard party" and the benefit of a one-party state to 
replace the apartheid caricature of "bourgeois" parliamentary democracy. 16 Slovo criticized, 
further, policies based on the "big bang theory of socialism" and argued that "many 
ingredients of social systems which succeed one another ... cannot be separated by a 
Chinese Wall". The outcome of his argument was that the nationalist and socialist 
struggle must be one for "multi-party post-apartheid democracy" and for "political pluralism" 
involving a guarantee for all citizens of "the basic rights and freedoms of organization, 
speech, thought, press, movement, residence, conscience, and religion". 
Slovo's paper said little, however, about how these values and goals could be promoted 
when the ANC was already in the process of fighting for them; and it is not clear from his 
formulations to what extent ethnic forms of organization and mobilization would be 
acceptable elements of the new pluralism. Concerning such issues, "Preparing for Freedom", 
an ANC discussion paper prepared by Albie Sachs in late 1989, is more articulate and 
provocative.17 For Sachs, "the method is the message" in the struggle against apartheid (p 
24), and this implies that pluralism must be not only a distant goal of the future but also a 
characteristic of nationalist political mobilization here and now: 
... we exercise true leadership in being non-hegemonic, by selflessly trying to create 
the widest unity of the oppressed and to encourage all forces for change. by showing 
the people that we are fighting not to impose a view upon them but to give them the 
right to choose the kind of society they want and the kind of government they want. 
(P 28) 
The call is not 
for a homogenised South Africa made up of identikit citizens ... we [must] envisage 
[South Africa] as a multi-lingual country. It will be multi-faith and multi-cultural as 
well. The objective is not to create a model culture into which everyone has to 
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assimilate. but to acknowledge and take pride in the cultural variety of our people. In 
the past, attempts were made to force everyone into the mould of the English 
gentleman, projected as the epitome of civilisation, so that it was an honour to be 
oppressed by the English. Apartheid philosophy, on the other, hand, denied any 
common humanity and insisted that people be compartmentalised into groups forcibly 
kept apart. In rejecting apartheid. we do not envisage a return to a modified form of 
the British imperialist notion, we do not plan to build a non-racial yuppie-dom which 
people may enter only by shedding and suppressing the cultural heritage of their 
specific community. (p 24f.l 
On the other hand, Sachs refuses to accept - either in the struggle or in the envisaged 
future democratic dispensation - forms of "tribal chauvinism" and "ethnic exclusiveness" (pp 
26 and 27) which do not recognize a minimum set of nationally universal institutions, 
rights and regulations within "a single South Africa" (p 24). 
While the unified nation is thus still the fundamental frame of reference for political 
imagination, and the boundaries between "exclusive" and legitimate ethnic organization 
may be difficult to draw exactly, Albie Sachs's paper does indeed appear to draft an agenda 
l for a new and different political culture as the necessary base for a functioning democracy. l 
In the context of this vision, one could imagine an "unhardening" of ethnicity which would 
allow it to act as a focus for organization, and even as the basis for the founding of political 
I parties, alongside organizations bringing people together according to alternative criteria of 
social identity. 
Another tendency which might, paradoxically, help to further an "unhardening" of 
ethnicity, is the growing awareness of the way in which certain types of ethnic 
organizations have been turned into direct instruments of state violence against the 
opposition in South Africa. The hearings of the Goldstone Commission and the stubborn 
journalistic campaigns of journals like the Weekly Mail, the New Nation and the Vrye 
Weekblad have unearthed increasingly hard evidence that the South African Police and the 
South African Defence Force have been co-operating extensively with the Inkatha Freedom 
Party in an effort to ethnicize the premises of township politics into basically confrontations 
between Zulu and Xhosa. This has, typically, taken the form of Inkatha's mobilizing or 
pressuring hostel-dwelling migrant labourers into hit squads which have then been trained 
by police or army personnel to attack ANC meetings, leaders or sympathizers, or to engage in 
acts of random violence and killing with the intention of destablizing any "normal" and 
peaceful build-up of oppositional political culture and procedure in black African 
communities. 18 
While the immediate outcome of such bloody intervention and ethnicization of politics is to 
make the establishment of the foundations of a tolerant and pluralist alternative political 
culture along Albie Sachsian lines extremely difficult, the more long-term effect, if the 
violence is brought under control and its background fully clarified, might be to expose the 
joint Inkatha-South African security force mobilization as representing a very particular 
type of politicization of ethnicity, which is as destructive to other forms of locality- and 
language-based loyalties as it aims to be to non-ethnic nationalist organization. The 
exposure and awareness of the special character of Inkatha's uses of notions of ethnicity 
for narrow purposes of state manipulation might therefore, in the end, help to open up the 
political field to other varieties of ethnic discourse, and to organization of a more peaceful 
and "unhardened" type which would be able to interact with differently based groupings 
within the framework of a commonly agreed political cultural consensus. 19 
The need to take ethnicity and locally-based cultures and political languages seriously is 
related to the possibilities for entering into dialogue with and representing some of the 
poorest and weakest groups in society - the rural proletariat, migrant workers and, not 
least, women, who have had restricted access to education and to central national 
languages, and whose needs therefore tend to remain unarticulated and disregarded unless 
their local languages and cultural terms of reference are taken into account. This is a point 
which has recently been made quite convincingly by Luke Mhlaba in the context of political 
and cultural development in Zimbabwe.= Mhlaba not only argues the need to support the 
development of local language strategies in education, media production and cultural policy 
in order to provide democratic possibilities for all groups in society, but also the necessity of 
reducing the concentration of political power at central national state level and of working 
instead towards more federalist forms of government with a high degree of power delegated 
to provincial and local levels. 
While federalism, in the case of South Africa, has attained a bad name because of its 
association with apartheid strategies of working towards a basically racist and economically 
unjust union of semi-independent "homelands", and the belief in the necessity of "a single 
South Africa", a firm credo of African nationalist and anti-apartheid politicians, future 
developments in the greater southern African region might eventually bring into question, 
in a new way, the representational and economic adequacy of present political boundaries 
and national state levels. If South Africa is democratized, and restrictions on trade, 
investment and other forms of economic interaction reduced, it might come to make sense 
to reduce the influence of present-day national states in favour of new institutions of 
government to be built up at regional level. This, in turn, would require a substantial reform 
and expansion of representational and administrative institutions at the local level, which 
might provide the opportunity for rethinking the issue of federalism with a view to providing 
political structures with a higher degree of legitimacy and responsiveness vis-a-vis the 
poorest and weakest groups in society. Such a development, again, might help to dismantle 
and "unharden" the opposition between nationalist and ethnic political principles as it 
exists today and would require presently nationalist politicians to develop both programmes 
and discourses that are more sensitive to local needs and understandings. 
The speeches made and documents presented at the Ulundi Annual General Meeting of the 
Inkatha Freedom Party in 1991 demonstrated an awareness on the part of Chief Buthelezi 
and his organization that groups such as women who are weak in terms of access to 
national cultural resources provide them with a particularly promising base for recruitment. 
Thus, in the section of his central speech dealing with "The role of women in the politics of 
change", Buthelezi emphasized the special relationship which exists between himself as 
leader and the women of his party: "In the IFP women have always been the backbone of my 
political support. and of the resilience of our Party ... If women allow themselves to be 
dragged on behind male-dominated political Parties, they will be authoring their own 
deprivation in the future." [211 At the same time, in spite of these almost feminist 
exhortations, the messages addressed specifically to women demonstrated how central 
gender issues are in the construction of ethnic political ideology. Thus, when Buthelezi 
referred to "a whole new social class of persons" having been brought into being by apartheid 
- "the unmarried black mothers" - he was activating the ideological tenets of the family and 
the homestead which Jeff Guy has been describing, the virtues of a cultural traditionalism 
which have come under threat from both a "modernist" government and from left 
nationalist politicians who are betraying their cultural roots. 
While gender and ethnicity do thus represent types of identity formation which are in many 
ways different and require different approaches of exploration, they also represent 
ideological registers and discourses which are interwoven in the terrain of local, 
everyday-life politics. If this terrain is neglected as an arena for articulation and interaction 
by nationalist politicians, it is left open for monopolization by other forces whose aims in 
ethnicisizing politics are not necessarily those of working towards democracy. 
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